在美国经济学家西奥多·舒尔茨提出的人力资本理论的视域下，员工系公司重要的人力资本；而现代公司治理体系强调所有权和经营权分离，股东倾向于只投入成本而不参与经营，人力资本的使用往往会受到一定程度的制约。因此股权激励应运而生，其将公司员工纳入剩余收益的分配中，使得员工的报酬收入与公司业绩挂钩，让员工在实现个人利益大化的同时为公司创造更大的价值。在股权激励的场景下设计股权架构，当然应追求激励效果、充分发挥其吸引、保留人才的作用，但更应强调的是对激励对象的管控，使其不至于本末倒置、影响实控人对公司的控制。笔者推荐实控人设立有限合伙企业间接持股，而非选择让员工直接持股。

In the perspective of the human capital theory proposed by American economist Theodore Schultz, employees are important human capital for companies; The modern corporate governance system emphasizes the separation of ownership and management rights, and shareholders tend to only invest costs without participating in operations. The use of human capital is often constrained to a certain extent. Therefore, equity incentives have emerged, which include company employees in the distribution of surplus income, linking their compensation income to company performance, allowing employees to create greater value for the company while maximizing their personal interests. In the context of equity incentives, designing an equity structure should certainly pursue incentive effects and fully leverage its role in attracting and retaining talent. However, it is even more important to emphasize the control of incentive targets, so as not to reverse priorities and affect the actual controller's control over the company. The author recommends that the actual controller establish a limited partnership enterprise to indirectly hold shares, rather than allowing employees to directly hold shares.

首先，有限合伙型持股平台有效避免了股东人数的限制。根据《公司法》第42条以及第92条的规定，有限责任公司股东人数上限为50人，股份有限公司为200人。对于激励对象较多的企业而言，如果任由全部激励对象都采取直接持股，人数容易突破《公司法》规定的限制。这种情况下，公司可以考虑设置多个有限合伙企业予以规避，只需保证每个合伙企业人数低于法定的50人即可。

Firstly, limited partnership shareholding platforms effectively avoid restrictions on the number of shareholders. According to Article 42 and Article 92 of the Company Law, the maximum number of shareholders for a limited liability company is 50, and for a joint-stock limited company it is 200. For enterprises with a large number of incentive targets, if all incentive targets are allowed to directly hold shares, the number of people may easily exceed the restrictions stipulated in the Company Law. In this case, the company can consider setting up multiple limited partnerships to avoid it, as long as the number of people in each partnership is less than the legal limit of 50.

其次，有限合伙型持股平台可以保证实控人的控制权。在员工直接持股的模式下，存在无法形成有效的公司股东会决议的隐患，实控人不能保证激励对象始终能保持对审议事项的赞成态度，如重大事项上实控人所持表决权不能形成2/3以上的绝对控制，决议的命运即掌握在激励对象这些关键少数手中。而在有限合伙型的持股平台，由激励对象担任有限合伙人（LP），实控人担任普通合伙人（GP），从而使激励对象只能通过持股平台间接收获公司股息、分红等，而实控人作为GP可以执行合伙事务，有效地掌握了对于持股平台所持公司股权的表决权，保证了控制权的稳定性。此外，如涉及公司的股权变更、增资，实务中工商部门一般都需要全体股东签字方能完成变更手续。假设任意一位激励对象拒绝配合签字，公司都将面临无法变更的僵局。再者，如实控人与激励对象之间发生矛盾，不排除激励对象可能会提起股东诉讼，从而影响到公司的正常运营，严重者甚至会出现公司僵局。而有限合伙企业则杜绝了前述情形出现的可能，其起到了很好的纠纷阻隔作用，让股东们的纠纷都在持股平台内解决，不至于殃及公司。

Secondly, a limited partnership shareholding platform can ensure the control rights of the actual controller. In the mode of direct employee shareholding, there is a hidden danger that effective resolutions of the company's shareholders' meeting cannot be formed. The actual controller cannot guarantee that the incentive objects can always maintain a favorable attitude towards the deliberation matters. For example, on major issues, the actual controller's voting rights cannot form an absolute control of more than 2/3, and the fate of the resolution is in the hands of the key few of the incentive objects. In a limited partnership type shareholding platform, the incentive object serves as the limited partner (LP), and the actual controller serves as the general partner (GP), so that the incentive object can only indirectly receive company dividends, bonuses, etc. through the shareholding platform. The actual controller, as the GP, can execute partnership affairs and effectively control the voting rights of the company's equity held by the shareholding platform, ensuring the stability of control rights. In addition, if it involves changes in the company's equity or capital increase, in practice, the industrial and commercial department generally requires the signatures of all shareholders to complete the change procedures. If any incentive recipient refuses to cooperate and sign, the company will face an unchangeable deadlock. Furthermore, if there is a conflict between the actual controller and the incentive object, it cannot be ruled out that the incentive object may file a shareholder lawsuit, which may affect the normal operation of the company, and in severe cases, even lead to a company deadlock. And limited partnership enterprises eliminate the possibility of the aforementioned situation, playing a good role in preventing disputes, allowing shareholders' disputes to be resolved within the shareholding platform, without affecting the company.

当然，单从税负角度来看，有限合伙型持股平台并非优解。在公司分红的场景下，如系自然人直接持股，员工个人应根据《个人所得税法》的规定，按照股息、红利所得缴纳20%的所得税。公司上市后，自然人可享受相应的税收优惠。根据《财政部、国家税务总局、证监会关于实施上市公司股息红利差别化个人所得税政策有关问题的通知》、《关于上市公司股息红利差别化个人所得税政策有关问题的通知》的规定，对个人持有的上市公司限售股，限售期内的应纳税所得额减按50%计算；解禁后如持股期限超过1年的，可暂免征收个人所得税。而在有限合伙的持股模式下，根据《国家税务总局关于<关于个人独资企业和合伙企业投资者征收个人所得税的规定>执行口径的通知》，不论公司是否上市，激励对象都应就其取得的股息、红利适用20%的税率缴纳个人所得税。从长远来看，有限合伙型持股平台在税负成本上要高于直接持股。但正如上文所述，股权激励的主要矛盾应该是维护控制权、管控激励对象，因此税负成本作为次要矛盾应适当让位。

Of course, from the perspective of tax burden alone, limited partnership shareholding platforms are not an optimal solution. In the scenario of company dividends, if natural persons directly hold shares, employees should pay 20% income tax on dividends and bonus income in accordance with the provisions of the Personal Income Tax Law. After the company goes public, natural persons can enjoy corresponding tax benefits. According to the "Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Relevant Issues Concerning the Implementation of Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Bonuses of Listed Companies" and the "Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Bonuses of Listed Companies", for restricted shares held by individuals in listed companies, the taxable income during the restricted period shall be reduced by 50%; If the shareholding period exceeds one year after lifting the ban, personal income tax can be temporarily exempted. In the limited partnership shareholding model, according to the Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on the Implementation Criteria of the Regulations on the Collection of Personal Income Tax for Investors of Sole Proprietorship Enterprises and Partnership Enterprises, regardless of whether the company is listed or not, incentive recipients should pay personal income tax at a rate of 20% on the dividends and bonuses they receive. In the long run, limited partnership shareholding platforms have higher tax costs than direct shareholding. But as mentioned earlier, the main contradiction of equity incentives should be to maintain control and manage the incentive objects, so the cost of tax burden should be appropriately given way as a secondary contradiction.

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